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In a nutshell 17 
• Purchase-protect-resale (PPR) programs, such as revolving funds, allow conservation organizations to 18 
purchase private land with conservation value and resell it with a protective agreement, enabling cost 19 
recovery 20 
• Globally, more than US$384m is available in PPR funds, with over 684,000 hectares protected to date 21 
• PPR programs can potentially be financially self-sustaining 22 
• The implementation of PPR can be complex and uncertain, and subject to the market for conservation 23 
properties 24 
• Identifying property types that can meet conservation objectives and recover costs within a reasonable 25 
timeframe, and drawing insights from economics to assist decision-making, could increase the 26 
effectiveness of PPR and improve conservation outcomes. 27 
Abstract 28 
Global conservation efforts are increasingly focused on expanding the amount of private land permanently 29 
protected for biodiversity. These efforts are often constrained by financial resources, particularly where 30 
land acquisition is expensive, or where landowners are reluctant to enter into conservation agreements. 31 
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Purchase-protect-resale (PPR) programs are used by conservation organizations in a number of countries to 32 
facilitate the purchase, resale and protection of private land. For the first time, we systematically review 33 
the literature on PPR and collate information on its use around the world. We find more than US$384m 34 
available in PPR funds, and over 684,000 hectares protected to date. We identify unique attributes of this 35 
approach, the challenges of its implementation, and discuss its potential for protecting land unsuitable for 36 
other conservation approaches. Our analysis highlights the importance of selecting appropriate properties 37 
and we argue that insights from the economics literature could help increase the effectiveness of PPR 38 
programs. 39 
Introduction 40 
The protection of private land is an important part of global efforts to conserve biodiversity. Whilst short-41 
term and non-binding mechanisms exist for conserving private land (Mayer and Tikka 2006; Santangeli et 42 
al. 2016), permanent protection mechanisms are often preferable land due to the heightened certainty 43 
that ecological values will remain protected into the future. In addition, many permanent protection 44 
mechanisms enable the establishment of Privately Protected Areas (PPAs) – protected areas ‘under private 45 
governance’ – which are seen as increasingly important instruments for achieving the Convention on 46 
Biological Diversity Aichi Target for ecologically representative protected area networks (Stolton et al. 47 
2014). 48 
Two dominant approaches currently exist for creating PPAs and permanently protecting biodiversity on 49 
private land. Perhaps the most prominent is the outright purchase of land with conservation value and its 50 
ongoing management for biodiversity (‘acquisition’). The acquisition approach allows conservation 51 
organizations to strategically purchase land of high conservation value and manage it over time, an 52 
approach that may be particularly effective for conserving biodiversity where development pressures are 53 
high and land supply is tightly constrained (Armsworth and Sanchirico 2008). However, acquiring land can 54 
be expensive, especially in landscapes with competing land uses and high land values (eg peri-urban areas) 55 
(Newburn et al. 2005), and funding for long-term management can be difficult to obtain (Pasquini et al. 56 
2011). Whilst important for conservation, the acquisition approach on its own is unlikely a viable solution to 57 
conserving biodiversity on private land on large scales (Fairfax et al. 2005). 58 
The second dominant approach for creating PPAs is for conservation organizations to establish permanent 59 
agreements with landowners, such as conservation covenants and easements (Fishburn et al. 2009; 60 
Fitzsimons 2015). These agreements are voluntary for landowners, but legally bind current and future 61 
owners to either active management or restricted use of their land to conserve biodiversity (Fitzsimons and 62 
Carr 2014), and are used by organizations in a growing number of countries, including Australia, Canada, 63 
New Zealand, and the United States (Ewing 2008; Fishburn et al. 2009; Fitzsimons 2015; TNC 2016). They 64 
offer an enduring approach to protection (Hardy et al. 2017) that reduces development pressures on 65 
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biodiversity (Pocewicz et al. 2011), whilst proving less costly to conservation organizations than land 66 
acquisition and ongoing management (Parker 2004; Comerford 2013) and avoiding the social disruption of 67 
large-scale land acquisitions (see Mansergh et al. 2008). However, implementation of permanent 68 
agreements relies on landowners volunteering their property for protection, limiting their application to a 69 
subset of landowners (Comerford 2013), and sometimes requiring the use of financial incentives to 70 
encourage uptake (Rissman et al. 2013). Each new permanent agreement also requires conservation 71 
organizations to take on long-term costs (Figgis et al. 2005) such as administration, monitoring and 72 
compliance, and enforcement (Rissman et al. 2013), and in some cases the provision of ongoing 73 
stewardship support to landowners (Adams et al. 2012). Where the agreement is difficult for the 74 
organization to establish, monitor, or enforce, these costs may make acquisition a preferable approach 75 
(Parker 2002), provided the property is available for purchase. 76 
Conservation using purchase-protect-resale 77 
An alternative to outright purchase of land is for conservation organizations to acquire private land and 78 
then sell it on to new, conservation-minded owners, in the process adding an in-perpetuity conservation 79 
covenant or easement to protect the lands conservation values. The approach is broad and not well-80 
defined (we refer to it here as purchase-protect-resale or PPR), and is currently achieved by organizations 81 
through several means. One is to use a dedicated fund (a “revolving fund”) to purchase private land with 82 
conservation value, and then resell the land to new owners with a permanent conservation agreement 83 
added to the property title (Fitzsimons and Wescott 2001; Hardy et al. 2018). Fund capital is replenished 84 
mostly through reselling the purchased properties (Fig 1), ideally recovering all purchase, transaction and 85 
ongoing costs (Brewer 2003; Cowell and Williams 2006), with replacement capital raised if required. The 86 
replenished capital is then used to purchase and protect additional properties (Safstrom 1996). A second 87 
and similar approach is to use a “revolving loan fund”, whereby fund capital is distributed for this purpose 88 
either within a conservation organization (an “internal” revolving fund) or to a separate organization or 89 
individual (an “external” revolving fund), with an agreement for the borrower to return the money (often 90 
with low or zero interest) within a given time frame (McBryde et al. 2005; see Clark 2007). A third approach 91 
is to buy and resell land using part of a large capital fund (e.g. an endowment fund) that is not marked 92 
exclusively for the PPR approach and may be used for other conservation activities or expenses. 93 
The PPR approach is closely related to ‘conservation buyer’ programs (Land Trust Alliance 2008) (where the 94 
conservation organization acts as a broker linking the seller and purchaser), except in the PPR approach the 95 
conservation organization takes interim ownership of the property. PPR is also similar to ‘pre-acquisition’ 96 
(Hunter and Kohring 2009), (where the conservation organization takes interim ownership before 97 
transferring to a public agency), although in PPR instead of a public agency the property is resold to a 98 
private party. Depending on how the approach is applied, PPR could also be considered part of 99 
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‘conservation development’ (‘projects that combine land development, land conservation, and revenue 100 
generation while providing functional protection for conservation resources’ (Milder 2007)). 101 
Despite the uptake of PPR and its potential as a financially self-sustaining approach, its role in conservation 102 
has received little attention. Focusing broadly on the PPR process (whether implemented via revolving 103 
funds, revolving loan funds, or as part of a larger capital fund), we provide the first global summary and 104 
analysis of PPR for private land conservation. This is done by collating information on current and past PPR 105 
programs, collected from the literature, web searches and practitioner knowledge. We also review the 106 
literature on PPR to identify the benefits and challenges of its use for permanently protecting private land. 107 
With a particular focus on conservation policy, we describe how PPR fits alongside the other main 108 
approaches to protecting biodiversity on private land, and assess the potential for modifications that may 109 
improve conservation outcomes. 110 
Gathering information on PPR 111 
We conducted a systematic review of scholarly databases (Web of Science, Google Scholar, Proquest and 112 
Scopus) and the world wide web for published and grey literature (predominantly reports, and excluding 113 
webpage content) relating to the process of purchasing unprotected private land and reselling it with a 114 
permanent conservation agreement (search terms are available in WebTable 1). Articles were included only 115 
if there was specific mention of using revolving funds, revolving loan funds, and/or the process of 116 
purchasing and re-selling private land to conserve biodiversity. We also added reports and book chapters 117 
that we knew contained information on PPR but had not been picked up through the search. From each of 118 
the articles in the final list we extracted any benefits or challenges of using PPR that had been identified, 119 
and then coded these based on emerging themes (see WebTable 2 for coding framework). 120 
Drawing from an exhaustive search of the literature, web searches and practitioner knowledge, we also 121 
compiled the first comprehensive global list of current and past PPR programs that have been used to 122 
purchase and resell private land. Programs were only included where they had been used for purchasing, 123 
protecting and reselling private land for biodiversity. Where information was available we recorded their 124 
total fund size, area protected, start date, end date, number of loans or properties protected, and the total 125 
value of all purchases or loans. 126 
History and current state of PPR 127 
The full details of all PPR programs we collated for each country is given in WebTable 3. This data shows 21 128 
PPR programs currently in operation globally, which grew rapidly from around 1990 (Fig 2; WebTable 3). 129 
There has been a slight decline in the number of programs since around 2010, although without an 130 
established definition or naming convention it is not clear if this represents a real decline. It is also likely 131 
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that not all PPR programs in existence were identified in our search. The first PPR fund was established in 132 
1955 in the USA, the country where the majority of current programs operate (13 out of 21), along with an 133 
additional two programs that are based in the USA but operate across both the USA and Canada. In 134 
Australia, the first of the six revolving fund programs was established in 1989, with five currently in 135 
operation. In Chile, one program has been established and has been operating for nine years. We identified 136 
a total of eight PPR programs that have closed since they began operating. 137 
The PPR approach has facilitated the protection of almost 684,000 hectares globally, 66% (450,000 138 
hectares) of which has occurred in the USA (Fig 3; WebTable 4). Almost US$384m is held in PPR funds 139 
globally, with the size of PPR programs averaging US$12.8m. By country, PPR programs covering both 140 
Canada and the USA had the largest average size (US$30m), with the USA having the largest amount 141 
available in total (almost US$214m; Fig 3). We note that these figures are underestimates as data was not 142 
available for all programs.  143 
Outcome of comprehensive review 144 
We found a total of 72 documents that met our criteria for inclusion in the review. Of these, 47 were either 145 
journal articles, books or book chapters, with the remainder comprising grey literature. Very few 146 
documents focused solely on PPR, with the vast majority mentioning this approach as part of a broader 147 
topic. The full list of articles is provided in WebTable 5. 148 
Benefits of the PPR approach  149 
A large range of benefits were attributed to PPR (Fig 4), some of which appear unique to this approach. 150 
These included the ability of the PPR approach to recover costs and recycle money for continual land 151 
purchase and protection – the most frequently cited benefit identified in our review (39 percent of all 152 
articles).  Surprisingly, there were only two specific mentions of the potential for PPR to be self-sustaining 153 
(4 percent), and all but one of these came from the grey literature.  154 
There were a number of benefits identified for PPR that also apply to other approaches for protecting 155 
private land. These included the ability to strategically target important properties with high conservation 156 
value (36 percent), for example land under threat of development, or land close to, complementing or 157 
linking protected areas. The ability of PPR to conserve expensive land was raised by 15 percent of all 158 
articles, particularly where costs could be recouped through resale, as was their ability to act quickly and 159 
purchase land as opportunities arise (14 percent), their beneficial development of the conservation 160 
property market (14 percent), and shifting land ownership to conservation-minded owners (14 percent). 161 
The process was stated as having particular benefit where voluntary protection or acquisition approaches 162 
were unlikely to be feasible, for example where landowners had been unwilling to participate or where 163 
land was expensive (15 percent). 164 
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Challenges for the PPR approach 165 
A summary of the challenges attributed to using PPR from the documents we identified are provided in 166 
Figure 5. Some of these were unique to PPR, the most frequently cited of which was the limited demand for 167 
conservation properties (15 percent of all articles). Related to this was the pressure to turn over properties 168 
to achieve conservation (10 percent). 169 
A number of challenges were raised for PPR that also apply to other protection approaches. Amongst these 170 
were the pressure to recover costs through property sales (15 percent of all articles), the supply of 171 
conservation properties (10 percent), the sequential consequences of making unfavorable decisions (6 172 
percent), operating in a dynamic property market (6 percent), and making decisions under uncertainty with 173 
limited information (13 percent). Also mentioned was the difficulty of operating with limited staff resources 174 
and expertise (10 percent), the potential for negative community perceptions over engaging in the property 175 
market (10 percent of articles), managing opportunity costs (7 percent), and the constraints of operating 176 
with limited fund capital (7 percent). 177 
The role for PPR in private land conservation 178 
Our review finds PPR has a number of beneficial attributes that make it useful for permanently protecting 179 
private land and increasing the contribution of PPAs. We have provided a summary of these in Table 1 and 180 
compared them to other approaches. Some attributes are unique to PPR – most notable is the ability to 181 
recover costs (eg purchase costs, as well as holding, protection and resale costs) through property resale, 182 
which facilitates the protection of additional properties. More than 684,000 hectares has been protected to 183 
date, and our review identifies heightened potential for PPR to protect expensive land (often in landscapes 184 
that are valuable for other productive uses and which contain threatened ecosystems), due to the ability to 185 
recover some, if not all, costs. This suggests PPR may be particularly useful where land values are beyond 186 
the reach of, or inefficient for, acquisition programs, and/or where landowners are reluctant to enter into 187 
permanent conservation agreements. However, we note that many of the articles in this review contained 188 
only limited information on PPR. Whilst there are some related studies evaluating the impacts of 189 
conservation development (eg Pejchar et al. 2007; Milder et al. 2008) and the cost-effectiveness of the pre-190 
acquisition approach (Armsworth and Sanchirico 2008), we found very few formal evaluations specifically 191 
focused on PPR in either the academic or the grey literature, with Clark (2007), McBryde et al (2005) and 192 
Binney and Whiteoak (2010) providing the most detailed accounts. Alongside its growing use, the unique 193 
attributes and process offered by PPR as a conservation tool highlights the need for further research, aimed 194 
in particular at evaluating the approach’s contribution to private land conservation and the creation of 195 
PPAs. 196 
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Our review also found a number of challenges that likely limit the capacity for PPR to protect private land. 197 
Being reliant on the property market means PPR is constrained by the demand for, and supply of, 198 
conservation properties, particularly those that will enable cost recovery through resale. Adding a 199 
permanent conservation agreement that restricts options for land use would likely reduce the number of 200 
potential buyers, impacting upon resale times and prices. Moreover, a conservation agreement that 201 
restricts development rights has the potential to diminish property values, suggesting at times managers 202 
would likely need to consider selling properties at a financial loss, although the effect of these agreements 203 
can be uncertain (Winfree et al. 2006). There are also social factors likely to influence the success of PPR 204 
programs, partly relating to the characteristics individual properties (eg aesthetics, location), but also to 205 
how buyers perceive the relative novelty of owning a high-conservation value property (Corcuera et al. 206 
2002), and behavioral aspects that might impact on their decision to purchase such as social norms 207 
(Adamowicz and Olewiler 2016). To some extent, PPR programs can minimize resale challenges by focusing 208 
on properties attractive to conservation buyers, and designing agreements that allow for residential or 209 
recreational use whilst protecting ecological values (Hardy et al. 2018). At present little guidance is 210 
available about which properties are most suitable for PPR programs beyond general statements on 211 
conservation value and attractiveness to market (Whelan 1997), and this would be worth exploring further. 212 
In addition, managers of PPR programs need to deliver conservation outcomes amidst limits on fund capital 213 
and the need to sustain their funds over time. Similar to other conservation acquisition approaches 214 
(Parkhurst and Shogren 2005), purchasing a property for later resale results in foregone opportunities to 215 
use those funds for alternative conservation actions (especially where the PPR process is undertaken using 216 
parts of a larger capital fund also used for other types of activities). In the resale process, there are likely 217 
notable opportunity costs for managers to consider. For example, an opportunity may arise to sell a 218 
property at a loss, where the manager faces a decision of whether to accept the offer, or to hold onto the 219 
property in the hope of obtaining a better offer in the future. This decision may not be straightforward, as 220 
in a weak or declining property market the decision to reject the offer and hold the land results in funds 221 
remaining tied up in the land, and opportunities to conserve additional land whilst the market is low are 222 
foregone. However, if a manager declines the offer in a strong or rising market, the chance of receiving 223 
higher future offers increases, but in this case the properties that are the opportunities on which to spend 224 
these funds in future are also likely to be more expensive. Constraints on resources, expertise and 225 
information likely limits the capacity for managers to account for the complex dynamics of the property 226 
market and assess these opportunity costs (Naidoo et al. 2006), leading to considerable uncertainty over 227 
the timing or nature of outcomes. Presumably a larger PPR fund (relative to the cost of conservation 228 
properties) would help mitigate these challenges, providing greater capacity to purchase a mix of different 229 
properties (i.e. a ‘portfolio’), flexibility to absorb greater risks with recovering costs and resale times, and 230 
the ability to regularly buy and turn over (‘revolve’) properties. Nonetheless, policy-makers and 231 
practitioners should note that these challenges make it difficult for PPR programs to make large 232 
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conservation gains quickly (Binney and Whiteoak 2010), although how these impact on the effectiveness of 233 
PPR programs is not yet clear. This would be worthy of future research, particularly in comparison to other 234 
permanent protection approaches. 235 
Having a mix of approaches is likely beneficial for implementing private land conservation (Doremus 2003) 236 
and may also boost participation rates (see Greiner et al. 2008). The ability of PPR programs to utilize the 237 
conservation property market and proactively create PPAs, like other forms of conservation development 238 
(Milder 2007), makes PPR a useful part of the private land conservation policy mix alongside binding and 239 
non-binding approaches, financial incentive payments, and acquisition. However, as PPR shares attributes 240 
with other permanent protection approaches (see Table 1), policy-makers need to be aware of the 241 
potential for overlap. For example, because both PPR and acquisition can be used to target specific 242 
properties, with opportunities limited by landowners willing to sell, there is potential for property 243 
purchases to be concentrated in the same area, which could inflate land prices or push development into 244 
unwanted areas (Armsworth et al. 2006). Here collaborative approaches between conservation agencies 245 
would be beneficial (Jansujwicz and Calhoun 2010; Gordon et al. 2013), but the issue highlights the need to 246 
clarify a space for PPR in the conservation policy mix. From our review, we suggest the role for PPR is in 247 
protecting private land with conservation value where: i) conservation values are compatible with and 248 
attractive for private ownership; ii) an acquisition-to-hold approach or permanent agreement with existing 249 
landowners is unlikely or infeasible; and iii) resale is likely to recover (at least most) costs within a 250 
reasonable timeframe. Policy-makers considering the use of PPR should also note that due to their 251 
constraints, the likely contribution of this approach is incremental protection of private land rather than 252 
rapid gains (see also Cowell and Williams 2006), and should be thought of as a longer-term investment that 253 
facilitates a gradual increase in the number of PPAs. 254 
Despite its uptake, it is important for policy-makers to note that PPR is unlikely to be appropriate in all 255 
regions. All of the programs identified in this review were operating in countries with predominantly neo-256 
liberal economies, and it is unlikely that PPR would be suitable without an existing market for private 257 
conservation properties, or where demand for conservation properties is weak. This may also apply to the 258 
type of fund (eg internal or external revolving loan fund), where perhaps due to the large number of land 259 
trusts, and the market for conservation properties, all external revolving loan funds were based in the USA. 260 
Regardless of the type of fund, conservation organizations need a pool of initial capital (usually raised 261 
through government, philanthropic or private investment sources) with sufficient purchasing power to buy 262 
important conservation properties. The Australian revolving fund programs, which are dedicated to the 263 
purchase and resale of high value conservation land (and in some cases also covering staff and operational 264 
costs), received much of their start-up capital from government (Cowell and Williams 2006). Furthermore, 265 
the reliance on permanent conservation agreements means PPR is unlikely to be suitable where property 266 
rights are not well defined or enforced (Pasquini et al. 2011). Organizations would also require the 267 
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authority to purchase land and establish conservation agreements, appropriate skills in ecological 268 
assessment, expertise in real estate markets and staff resourcing to adequately assess, purchase, protect 269 
and resell properties. 270 
Improving the implementation of PPR 271 
Our review suggests complex, cross-disciplinary decision-making is required for implementing PPR 272 
programs. Property selection appears a particular challenge that draws together elements of economics, 273 
social science, policy, ecology and conservation, characterized by limited information and high uncertainty, 274 
with decisions having sequential impacts on future success. Despite the importance of property selection, 275 
our review did not uncover research identifying which types of properties are most appropriate for PPR. 276 
Presumably some properties have a mix of ecological, amenity and financial characteristics that make them 277 
more suitable for PPR than others. The identification and prioritization of high conservation value sites can 278 
be done in a number of ways (Wilson et al. 2006; Tulloch et al. 2015), and a socio-ecological approach could 279 
help identify regions attractive to conservation buyers that will also benefit biodiversity (Ban et al. 2013). 280 
But which mix of characteristics make a property suitable for fast resale and a high likelihood of recovering 281 
costs? How do we trade-off between these characteristics to find the most important ones? And how can 282 
we ensure both conservation and resale goals are met within the dynamic and uncertain nature of the real 283 
estate market? 284 
There are also broader questions about the use of PPR as an approach to conservation, and here insights 285 
from economics could be particularly useful. For example, portfolio theory could help develop strategies to 286 
manage risk and uncertainty, relating to both the mix of properties bought by PPR programs, and the place 287 
of PPR programs amongst the broader range of conservation policy options (Doremus 2003; Ando and Shah 288 
2014). Return on investment analysis could explore the relative benefits of different purchasing strategies 289 
(Boyd et al. 2015), taking into account the net financial outcome of the purchase-protect-resale process 290 
(i.e. resale price minus purchase and all transaction costs). Further, real options analysis could help 291 
managers of PPR programs assess the timing of purchases (e.g. relative to property market trends) and 292 
understand the associated sequential decision impacts (Ando and Shah 2014). 293 
The ongoing implementation and improvement of PPR programs would benefit from additional research, 294 
and we suggest five key questions as a starting point: i) to what extent can PPR programs leverage the 295 
capital of conservation organizations, does this change between different types of PPR programs, and how 296 
does this compare to other conservation finance tools?; ii) how do conservation outcomes scale with 297 
increased size or risk profiles of PPR programs, and would pooling PPR funds across organizations provide 298 
greater leverage of capital and enhanced conservation outcomes?; iii) how should PPR programs define a 299 
portfolio of purchase decisions to balance their financial risk, and how much financial risk should a PPR 300 
program take on?; iv) how much of a financial loss should PPR programs be willing to absorb given the 301 
 10 
limited market for conservation properties and likely opportunity costs?; and v) what are the sequential 302 
impacts of different purchasing strategies (for example, is it more effective to purchase properties with 303 
exceptional conservation values and delayed resale than to purchase properties with lower conservation 304 
values but a greater likelihood of rapid turnover, and thus provide faster incremental gains?)?  305 
Conclusions 306 
Increasing the amount of private land permanently protected for biodiversity is likely to remain an 307 
important focus for global conservation efforts. Where supportive conditions exist, and with appropriate 308 
property selection, PPR programs show promise as a self-sustaining approach for creating PPAs and 309 
permanently protecting biodiversity on private land. Of interest to policy-makers, PPR programs may be 310 
complementary to other approaches for conserving private land, protecting properties where acquisition is 311 
expensive or otherwise infeasible (that are attractive for resale), or where landowners are unwilling to 312 
enter into permanent conservation agreements. This potentially frees up capital for other acquisition funds 313 
to buy other types of properties. Nonetheless, the implementation of PPR appears complex, and arguably 314 
drawing insights from economics into decision-making could help increase the effectiveness of the tool, 315 
whereby tradeoffs between conservation values and financial sustainability can be explicitly considered. 316 
Beyond these immediate questions, a number of general issues with PPR remain unexplored: Which 317 
properties are more suitable for private owners and which for conservation organizations, over the long 318 
term?; How does the social landscape change with the ongoing implementation of PPR – as permanent 319 
agreements become more common in the real estate market do they become more acceptable, or is there 320 
a social or political ceiling to this approach?; Can they be used to encourage other sustainable land uses 321 
beyond biodiversity conservation?; And what is the likely financial ceiling for setting up PPR programs given 322 
the limited funding available for conservation? Resolving these issues will allow for more effective 323 
application of PPR in conjunction with other approaches, and in turn, enhanced conservation of biodiversity 324 
on private land.  325 
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Tables 438 
Table 1. The space for purchase-protect-resale approaches amongst other programs for permanent protection of private land 439 
with conservation value* 440 
Conservation 
approach 







Little or no acquisition or 
management costs 
Conservation by existing 
landowners 
 
Requires voluntary participation from 
landowners 
Maintaining landowner participation 
Purchase-protect-
resale 






Target important properties 
Protect expensive land and 
recover costs 
Speed of intervention 
Develop conservation property 
market 
Recovering costs through resale  
Purchasing re-saleable properties 
Market demand for conservation 
properties 
Requires landowners willing to sell 
Requires property turnover 
Maintaining new landowner  
participation 
Acquisition-to-hold Purchase and ongoing 
management 
Specialist management  
Target important conservation 
properties 
Acquiring properties difficult to 
resell 
Speed of intervention 
Requires landowners willing to sell 
Purchase and management costs 
Funding absolute property costs 
* A more detailed version of this table is available in WebTable 6  441 
    
Figure legends 442 
Figure 1. A property for sale in Tasmania, Australia, through the Tasmanian Land Conservancy revolving fund program (Photo 443 
courtesy of Matthew Newton) 444 
 445 
Figure 2. Timelines depicting the years of operation for purchase-protect-resale programs and the total number worldwide for 446 
conserving private land. Most of the 21 programs currently operating have emerged over the past 15 years. Crosses indicate 447 
programs that have ceased operating. Data was collated using a review of academic and grey literature and consultation with 448 
experts on PPR programs and all programs in the figure are detailed in WebTable 3. 449 
 450 
Figure 3. Number, average time of operation and average fund size of purchase-protect-resale programs used to permanently 451 
protect private land. More than US$384m are available in PPR programs, which have protected more than 684,000 hectares. All 452 
values are in USD. (see WebTable 4 for summary program data). These figures are underestimates as there are likely instances of 453 
PPR not captured in our search, and that data was not available for all identified PPR programs. 454 
 455 
Figure 4. The frequency of articles mentioning each of the purchase-protect-resale benefits that arose from the literature review. 456 
Shown as a percentage of all articles found. * indicates benefits unique to PPR 457 
 458 
Figure 5. The frequency of articles mentioning each of the purchase-protect-resale challenges that arose from the literature 459 
review. Shown as a percentage of all articles found. * indicates challenges unique to PPR 460 
 461 
